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I. SHIFTING CHINESE POLICY: FROM A PEG TO A BASKET

Between 1994 and July 2005, China maintained a fixed exchange rate,
or peg, of 8.28 renminbi' (RMB) or yuan, per U.S. dollar.2 For many years,

* Paul V. Sharobeem (B.A. New York University 2001; M.S.R.E. University of Florida
2007; J.D. University of Florida 2007) was Editor-in-Chief of the FloridaJournalof International
Law in 2007. He is now a corporate attorney practicing in the areas of securities, corporate
governance, and mergers and acquisitions. The author wishes to dedicate this Article to his wife
and son, Summer and Ethan, whose constant support and love over the past three years have made
all his work possible. The author also wishes to thank the rest of his family whose consistent
encouragement and advice have been invaluable along the way.
1. Literally translated, Renminbi means "the people's currency" while the term "Yuan" is
reserved as a unit of measurement used when counting (one yuan, two yuan, three yuan, and so on).
2. Wayne M. Morrison & Marc Labonte, China's Currency Peg: A Summary of the
Economic Issues 2005, CRS Report RS2162517, July 11, 2007, at CRS-1, available at
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21625.
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China's peg was equal to that which prevailed in the market, and so the
Chinese government did not need to take any action to keep the supply of
RMB in line with demand.3 However, as the relative demand for Chinese
goods and services increased, more RMB were required to purchase those
goods and services, resulting in an upward pressure on the value of the
RMB.4 Rather than allow the currency to naturally appreciate against the
dollar, the Chinese government continued its fixed exchange rate policy.
As justification for these measures, the Chinese government cited
economic instability and an underdeveloped banking system, among other
things.5
At the first sign of an appreciating RMB, the Chinese government
responded by increasing the supply of RMB and decreasing the supply of
another nation's currency by purchasing that nation's currency on the
currency market, thus restoring the desired equilibrium.6 In this way,
China employed a combination of domestic and international monetary
policies to relieve the upward pressure on the RMB and maintain the
pegged value of its currency.7
The Chinese government used strict capital controls as a primary tool
when increasing or decreasing the supply of RMB.8 For example, the
Chinese government required firms in China to exchange most of their
hard currency earnings to the central government in exchange for RMB. 9
While the Chinese government did eventually allow the RMB to be freely
convertible "for purposes of trade in goods and services," capital
transactions remained subject to strict controls to curtail unpredictable
flows of capital into or out of the country.' ° This meant that while the
RMB was convertible for trade transactions, it was still not freely

3. Wayne Morrison & Marc Labonte, China'sExchange Rate Peg: Economic Issues and
Optionsfor US. Trade Policy, CRS Report RL3216517, July 15, 2007, at CRS-3, available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32165.pdf.
4. Id.
5. Morrison & Labonte, supra note 2, at CRS-2.
6. Morrison & Labonte, supra note 3, at CRS-4.
7. Xinchen Sofia Lou, Challenging China'sFixed exchange Rate Regime: An Analysis of
US. Options, 28 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 455, 457-58 (2005).
8. Wayne M. Morrison, China-US.Trade Issues 2006, CRS Report IB91121, July 1,2005,
at CRS-S, availableat http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IB91121.
9. Id.
10. Lou, supra note 7, at 458-59. This language came from China's adoption of the
International Monetary Fund article VIII. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund [hereinafter IMF Articles], 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, art. VIII (1944), available at
www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/aa/aa08.htm#2.
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convertible for other types of financial flows such as portfolio
investments. "
To maintain its peg, the Chinese government also implemented strict
controls over the trading of the RMB. This tactic assured that the RMB's
value floated within a narrow band around the peg.'2 The Chinese central
bank, the People's Bank of China (PBOC), is the sole issuer and controller
of the RMB. Rather than allow the RMB to trade in the global currency
market, the PBOC determined daily what the exchange rate would be and
authorized trading only in a narrow band around its announced exchange
rate.13
Finally, under its fixed exchange rate system, the PBOC bought billions
of dollars on the currency markets in the form of U.S. Treasury bonds and
other foreign securities. 4 These large purchases of foreign exchange,
specifically U.S. dollar denominated assets, effectively decreased global
supply of the currency, raising the RMB's value until it once again fell
within the desired range of the peg.' 5 As of the date of this Note, China has
accumulated in excess of one trillion dollars in foreign exchange reserves,
approximately 70% of which are in U.S. currency.' 6 Of this $700 billion,
$339 billion is in the form of U.S. Treasury bonds.' 7
China was not the first country to use a fixed exchange rate.' 8 However,
the increasing amount of trade between the United States and China,' 9 as
11. Morrison & Labonte, supranote 2, at CRS-2 n.3.
12. Id. at CRS-1.
13. Lou, supra note 7, at 457-58. In order to gauge the relative worldwide level of demand
for the RMB, the PBOC created an inter-bank exchange market consisting of a select number of
authorized foreign exchange banks and financial institutions. The member banks were given a
predetermined exchange rate with respect to four major currencies (the U.S. dollar, the Euro, the
Hong Kong dollar, and the Japanese Yen) every day and were prohibited from trading the RMB
outside of a narrow band around the announced rate. Id.
14. Paul Blustein, PuttingPressureon China'sPeg: U.S. Wants Changein CurrencyPolicy,
but Benefits Aren't Clear-Cut, WASH. POST, May 11, 2005, at E01, available at www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/10/AR2005051001460.html.
15. Jonathan E. Sanford, China's Currency: Brief Overview of US. Options 2005, CRS
Report RS22338, Nov. 29, 2005, availableat http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57797.
pdf.
16. Marisa Morrison, A Chinese Currency Conundrum, National Interest Online,
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=1 3188.
17. See id.
18. Morrison & Labonte, supranote 3, at CRS-7. From the 1940s to the 1960s, the Bretton
Woods system linked the major currencies of the world. Prior to this time, the international gold
standard was also widely used to set exchange rates.
19. The total trade between the United States and China was $387 billion in 2007, up from
$343 billion in 2006, $285 billion in 2005, and just $5 billion in 1980. U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign
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well as a ballooning trade deficit between the countries,2" brought the
value of the RMB into focus as a growing point of contention beginning
in 2003.21 As pressure mounted from the United States and other countries
for China to alter its economic policies,22 the Chinese government began
seeking an alternative to its currency peg.
The most common alternative to a fixed exchange rate is a floating
exchange rate in which market supply and demand cause a currency's
exchange rate to continually fluctuate.2 3 Many countries, such as the
United States and the countries of the European Union, have decided to
implement free floating exchange rates. China, however, has expressed
concern about completely abandoning the peg in favor of a free floating
currency. 24 The cause of this reluctance is the perceived economic
weakness in key economic sectors such as the banking, insurance, and
export industries.25 Chinese officials have also been concerned that a rapid
an economic crisis which would
shift in currency policy might spark
26
ultimately lead to political unrest.
With great trepidation, China announced on July 21, 2005 that it would
abandon its decade old currency peg in favor of a new hybrid exchange
rate system. 2' The PBOC announced three major policy shifts that would
occur under this new system. First, the value of the RMB would be
appreciated from 8.27-8.11 RMB/USD, a 2.1% increase.28 Next, the new
hybrid exchange rate would remove the ridged dollar peg and instead, link
the RMB to a basket of currencies. 29 While the exact composition of the
currency basket is only known to Chinese authorities, it is widely

Trade Statistics, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2007.
20. The trade deficit with China, while still growing, is showing some signs of slowing down
thanks in part to a weakened dollar which has made U.S. exports more affordable. The total 2007
U.S. china trade deficit was $256.3 billion, up from $232.6 billion in 2006, and $202 billion in
2005. Id.
21. Lou, supra note 7, at 455.
22. In 2001 Japan argued that the RMB was undervalued and that it gave Chinese exporters
an unfair advantage. See Paul Wiseman, China'sCurrencyFlexes Its Muscle, USA TODAY, Dec.
19, 2001, at 5B.
23. Morrison & Labonte, supranote 3, at CRS-3.
24. Morrison & Labonte, supranote 2, at CRS-2.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Yumi Kuramitsu, China Ends Yuan DollarPeg,Shifts to CurrencyBasket, July 21,2005,
http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 10000006&sid=aO4ESaRrTpcU&refer-home (last
visited Dec. 17, 2007).
28. Id.
29. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol19/iss3/4

4

Sharobeem: Biting the Hand that Feeds Us: A Critical Analysis of U.S. Policy

BITING THE HAND THAT FEEDS US: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF US. POLICY TRENDS

speculated that the basket includes the euro, the yen, the U.S. dollar, as
well as other Asian currencies. 3' Finally, the central bank announced that
the RMB would be allowed to fluctuate by 0.3% each day above or below
a central parity, and further that, "the closing price of... the U.S. dollar
traded against the RMB . . . after the closing ... of the market each
working day would become the central parity for the . . . following
working day."'', Economists commonly
call this type of hybrid exchange
32
peg.,
"crawling
a
rate system
Many experts view this policy shift as an indication of additional,
future appreciations of the RMB.3 3 Jens Nordvig, a currency strategist at
Goldman Sachs Group Inc., believed that "what they're really doing is
leaving the door open to further revaluations. By not pegging the yuan to
the dollar, it gives the Chinese more flexibility to engineer a gradual
appreciation. ,' Had this new policy been allowed to function as
announced, the RMB could have risen by as much as 30% in five
months.35
Nevertheless, on July 27, 2005, the PBOC announced that it expected
no further appreciation of the RMB and that instead of a "crawling peg,"
the RMB would be subject to a "managed float., 36 The difference between
the two systems is hardly semantic. Rather than allow the RMB to
appreciate the full 0.3% per day as was announced, the PBOC considered
the daily changes of the RMB relative to the currencies in the basket and
decided what the appropriate exchange rate would be.37 Additionally, the
central bank reserved the right to determine when and how any further
appreciation should occur.38
These two latest announcements seemed to be at odds with one another
and economic experts and commentators alike offered at least three
interpretations as to the nature of the discrepancy. 39 First, some pointed to
these inconsistent policies as evidence of the ongoing internal struggle in

30. Peter S. Goodman, ChinaEndsFixed-Rate Currency: AdministrationHails PolicyShift,
WASH. POST, July 22, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/07/2 1/AR200507210035 l.html.
31. Sanford, supra note 15, at CRS-4.
32. Id.
33. Kuramitsu, supra note 27.
34. Id.
35. Sanford, supra note 15, at CRS-4.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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China between those who want to liberalize the RMB and those who want
to retain its sub-market value.4" Second, it was argued that the new system
was put in place simply as a facade, designed to distract the international
community.4' Finally, a third view was that China issued the two
conflicting announcements to confuse currency speculators.42
As of the date of this Note, the RMB has made some notable gains
against the U.S. dollar; however, this appreciation has been largely due to
the broad based decline in value of the U.S. dollar precipitated by the
recent ongoing problems in the U.S. economy.43 Since the announcements
in July 2005, there have been no further declarations from Chinese
officials that might clarify or otherwise disclose any policy position that
the PBOC might take with respect to the RMB." Despite repeated and
persistent requests from the international community,4 5 China has
consistently declined to comment about any future plans to revalue its
currency. 4 Some currency experts speculate that China will wait until its
domestic economy is stronger to revalue the RMB.4 Others, however, are
calling for urgent action.48

40. Sanford, supranote 15, at CRS-4. If this theory is correct, it would suggest that foreign
attempts to influence China's monetary policy could backfire. Foreign influence might strengthen
the hand of those in China who are resistant to change.
41. Id. China was scheduled to meet with officials from the International Monetary Fund on
August 3, 2005. In its 2004 meeting the IMF Board expressed some criticism of the Chinese
exchange rate system, suggesting that in 2005 China should make an effort to introduce more
market forces into its exchange rate policy. The advent of the new regime gave Chinese officials
something new to present, effectively buying China at least one more year.
42. Id. The July 27 announcement introduced the possibility that the value of the RMB might
increase, decrease, or stay the same. China must eventually appreciate its currency, as speculators
expect, but it must balance this priority against its interest in discouraging speculators from
bringing more money into the country.
43. As of March 24, 2008, the latest exchange rate is 7.06 RMB per U.S. dollar. See xrates.com, Chinese Yuan to 1 USD, http://www.x-rates.com/d/CNY/USD/graphl20.html (last
visited Mar. 24, 2008).
44. Sanford, supra note 15, at CRS-4-5.
45. The list of people and groups that have called on China to clarify its currency position
include the IMF Board, G-8 summit members, Japanese economic officials, U.S. Treasury
Secretary John Snow, President Bush, as well as the governing boards of both the IMF and the
World Bank. Id.
46. Sanford, supra note 15, at CRS-5.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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I.

THE CONTROVERSY

In order to understand why China's currency peg was, and continues
to be, so controversial one must first understand the nature of the
competing interests involved. Both China and the United States shared
benefits and burdens under the fixed peg system, as well as the "managed
float" system. This portion of the Note examines Chinese and U.S.
perspectives on former and current Chinese currency policy.
A. U.S. Perspective
In mid-2003 currency analysts in the United States began expressing
concern that China's currency is undervalued.49 Many accuse China of
manipulating its currency by its continual adherence first to the peg, and
now to a "managed float" that is substantially below fair market value.5"
Those who accuse China of currency manipulation 5' believe that the
ultimate goal of Chinese monetary policy is to gain an unfair trade
advantage which will lead to export-led growth.5 2 Allegedly, these
mercantilist practices have resulted in serious injury to the U.S.
manufacturing sector 3 and have greatly contributed to the U.S. trade

49. Lou, supranote 7, at 455.
50. Morrison, supra note 8, at CRS-6.
51. The label of "currency manipulator" is ultimately imposed by the Secretary of Treasury.
22 U.S.C. § 5304(b) (2007) says,
The Secretary of the Treasury shall analyze on an annual basis the exchange rate
policies of foreign countries, in consultation with the International Monetary
Fund, and consider whether countries manipulate the rate of exchange between
their currency and the United States dollar for purposes of preventing effective
balance of payments adjustments or gaining unfair competitive advantage in
international trade. If the Secretary considers that such manipulation is
occurring... the Secretary of the Treasury shall take action to initiate negotiations
with such foreign countries on an expedited basis.
22 U.S.C. § 5304 (2007).
52. L. Josh Bivens & Robert E. Scott, China Manipulates Its Currency-A Response is
Needed, EPI Policy Memorandum #116, Economic Policy Institute (Sept. 26, 2006) availableat
http://www.epinet.org/printer.cfn?id=2500&contenttype=l &nicename=pml 16. See also U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission [hereinafter ESRC], 2006 Report to Congress,
Nov. 2006, at 2-3.
53. Many critics of China's policy claim that,
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deficit.54 In addition to influencing the U.S. economy, some analysts have
also maintained that China's currency peg influences other East Asian
countries to manipulate their currencies to remain competitive with
Chinese goods."
This view is held by several interested groups including, but not limited
to, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission5 6 (ESRC),
many manufacturing sector representatives,57 and labor unions.5" Every
one of these groups has protested China's currency policies and lobbied
lawmakers for legislative reforms that protect against further loss of
American jobs.5 9
Interestingly, even among the critics of Chinese currency policy, there
seems to be no consensus as to how much the RMB is undervalued.6 °
Ernest Preeg, a senior fellow ofthe Manufacturer's Alliance, estimates that
the RMB is undervalued by 40%.61 The Institute for International

between 2000 and 2003, annual manufacturing employment in the United States
declined by almost 3 million jobs, and has been largely flat since then. The level
of manufacturing employment in 2003 was 14.3 million, the lowest since 1950.
[... ] In addition, the trade deficit in manufactured goods rose by $84 billion
between 2000 and 2003 and it is currently on pace to grow by another $150 billion
by the end of 2005 (for a total deficit increase of $234 billion in the 2000-05
period). The relationship between trade deficits in manufactured goods and
manufacturing employment seems obvious: imports decrease labor demand in
manufacturing while exports spur this demand. A rising trade deficit means, all
else equal, that labor demand in U.S. manufacturing is reduced.
L. Josh Bivens, Trade Deficits and Manufacturing Job Loss: Correlation and Causality, available
at http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/bpl 71 (footnotes omitted).
54. See Bivens & Scott, supra note 52.
55. See Prepared Remarks of Dr. C. Fred Bergsten, President, Institute for International
Economics, Before the House Small Business Committee, June 25, 2003.
56. See ESRC, supra note 52.
57. Many manufacturing sector representatives believe that the United States is in a
manufacturing recession because over 90% of the total U.S. job losses since 2000 have come from
the manufacturing sector. Because of the ballooning trade deficit, they have singled out China as
the biggest direct threat to U.S. manufacturers and the largest single source of job losses. Lou,
supra note 7, at 460.
58. The American Federation of Labor and Congress ofIndustrial Organizations (AFL-CIO),
the largest labor union in the United States, wants lawmakers to pass legislation that is "feasible,
quick, and will begin to ameliorate the job losses." Id. at 461.
59. Id.
60. Morrison, supra note 8, at CRS-6.
61. Preeg however, does not use a scientific analysis but rather relies on several observational
estimates to reach his conclusion. Ernest H. Preeg, Exchange Rate Manipulationto Gain an Unfair
CompetitiveAdvantage: The CaseAgainstJapanandChina,in DOLLAR OVERVALUATION AND THE
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Economics (HE) believes that the RMB is approximately 15-25%
undervalued.62 Goldman Sachs Economic Research Group has placed
RMB undervaluation at about 9.5-15%.63 Economist Jeffery Frankel's
model estimates that the RMB was undervalued by as much as 35% in
2000.' While no new data has become available for use in his model,
Frankel speculates that the undervaluation has only increased since the
model's date. 65 Finally, an oft cited estimate based on the Economist
magazine's Big Mac Index 66 places RMB undervaluation at 58%.67
The variance in these results is no doubt a function of the exceptionally
diverse methods used in their respective calculations. Some of these
models use highly sophisticated economic formulae, others rely on generic
"rules-of-thumb," and at least one simply compares the price of a Big Mac
sandwich in each country. "Participants in the debate about China's
currency seem to select the studies they quote more because they like their
conclusions than because they have determined that their underlying
methodology and assumptions are more correct., 6' For all their
differences, policymakers and economic scholars agree that the RMB is
undervalued by 15-40%.69
The degree of undervaluation is significant because, to the extent the
RMB is undervalued, Chinese exports to the United States receive a
government "subsidy" and thereby become cheaper than U.S. goods.
Conversely, U.S. imports to China are "taxed," making them more
expensive than they would otherwise be.7 ° This result has particularly
injured the textile, furniture, plastics, machine tools, and tool and dye
industries, which have borne the brunt of low cost competition from

WORLD ECONOMY 267-71 (C. Fred Bergsten & John Williamson eds., 2003). See also Chinese
Currency Manipulation, Testimony of Ernest H. Preeg, Ph.D., Before the U.S. Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, May 1, 2002.
62. Morris Goldstein, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Domestic and International
Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Oct. 1, 2003.
63. Jim O'Neill & Dominic Wilson, How China canHelp the World (Goldman Sachs Global
Econ. Paper No. 97, 2003).
64. Jeffrey Frankel, On the Renminbi, 6 CESIFo FORUM 16 (2005), available at
http://ksghorne.harvard.edu/-jfrankel/ChinaYuanpubO5CES-Ifo.pdf.
65. Id. at 8.
66. The Big Mac Index (BMI) is portrayed as a "light hearted guide" to exchange rates. The
BMI compares the price of a McDonald's Big Mac Sandwich in China to that in the United States.
Morrison & Labonte, supra note 3, at CRS-13.
67. Economic and FinancialIndicators,ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 2004, at 194.
68. Sanford, supranote 15, at CRS-2.
69. Morrison, supra note 8, at CRS-6.
70. Id.
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Chinese products.71 Representatives from these industry sectors, as well as
others, have strenuously lobbied Congress and the Bush Administration to
pressure China into appreciating its currency or allowing it to freely float.72
Some members of Congress have taken this request very seriously and
introduced several bills in the 109th Congress that called for action on the
part of the President, as well as the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).
One bill, sponsored by Senators Lindsey Graham and Chuck Schumer,
proposed a 27.5% across the board tariff on all products from China if it
failed to substantially revalue its currency to market levels.7 3 While the
senators withdrew the bill in September 2006, some believe the bill would
pass if put to a vote. 74 As of the date of this Note, four more bills have
been introduced in the 110th Congress which address the same issues and
propose measures substantially similar to penalties.75
President Bush publicly criticized the Chinese currency peg 76 and
77
raised the issue during meetings with Chinese President Hu Jintao.
Although the Bush Administration initially rejected a direct pressure
approach, its position on the peg seemed to toughen in April 2005 when
U.S. Treasury Secretary John Snow declared that, "China is now ready to
move to a more flexible exchange rate and should move now. ' 78 Shortly
after this and other statements were issued, the PBOC announced its new
"managed float" in July 2005.79
China's move to a basket of currencies was met with mixed reactions.
Many U.S. policymakers praised the move as a positive step in the right
direction; however, some were disappointed at the relatively small
revaluation and called on China to further appreciate the RMB.8° When it
became apparent that the PBOC had no further plans to appreciate the
RMB beyond the initial 2.1% increase, the mood in Washington decidedly

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See S.14, S.295, & H.R. 1575, 109th Cong. (2005).
74. Morrison, supra note 16. The bill received 67 votes in a procedural vote.
75. See H.R. 1002.IH, H.R.32 1.IH, S.796.IS, and H.R.782.IH, 110th Cong. (2007), available
at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/c 110query (using site to search for individual bills).
76. During an interview with CNBC's Ron Insana on Sept. 5, 2003, President Bush stated
that exchange rates should be determined by market forces. Interview by Ron Insana with George
W. Bush, President of the United States (Sept. 5, 2003).
77. Morrison, supra note 8,at CRS-7.
78. Id.In a May 17, 2005 report, the Treasury Department described China's exchange rate
policy as "a substantial distortion to world markets." Id.
79. See Sanford, supra note 15, at CRS-4.
80. Morrison, supra note 8,at CRS-7. See also Morrison, supra note 16.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol19/iss3/4

10

Sharobeem: Biting the Hand that Feeds Us: A Critical Analysis of U.S. Policy

BITING THE HAND THAT FEEDS US: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF US. POLICY TRENDS

changed.81 In November 2005, the Treasury reported that China's actions
were "not sufficient and do not represent fulfillment of the Chinese
authorities' [earlier] commitment."82 The Treasury's November report
stopped short of officially labeling China as a currency manipulator.83
Instead the report concluded that China's new system bore a strong
resemblance to its old system of pegging the RMB to the dollar.8"
B. Chinese Perspective
Chinese officials have vehemently denied that the peg was ever put in
place to obtain an unfair trade advantage vis-A-vis the United States.85
Rather, they have claimed that a fixed exchange rate was needed to
promote domestic economic stability and international monetary
credibility.86 China has repeatedly assured the international community
that it eventually plans to move to a freely floating currency, but that it
will not do so until Chinese officials are convinced that the domestic
economy is strong enough.87 Chinese officials are concerned that
abandoning the current currency policy too quickly would cause an
economic crisis in China and would cripple the export industry at a time
when crucial economic reforms are being made.88
One of the biggest areas of concern for Chinese officials is China's
underdeveloped banking system. 89 The banks in China are predominantly
state owned and are often called upon to make low-interest loans to other
state owned enterprises without regard to typical lending requirements
such as creditworthiness, collateral, and other risk assessments that market
driven lenders demand. 90 The banks are also called upon by their
government to carry large amounts of defaulted loans on their balance

81. See Morrison, supra note 8,at CRS-7.
82. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report to Congress on InternationalEconomic and
Exchange Rate Policies,at 18, Nov. 2005, availableat http://www.treas.gov/offices/internationalaffairs/economic-exchange-rates/i 12005_report.pdf.
83. Id. at 17-21.
84. Id.
85. Morrison & Labonte, supranote 2, at CRS-2.
86. Morrison & Labonte, supra note 3, at CRS-6-7.
87. Morrison, supra note 8, at CRS-6.
88. For the past several years, China has been undergoing the process of closing down
inefficient state-owned factories and privatizing them, as well as a pervasive restructuring of the
state banking system. Morrison, supra note 8, at CRS-6.
89. Morrison & Labonte, supra note 3, at CRS-2.
90. ESRC, supra note 52, at 5.
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sheets and forgive such debts held by state owned enterprises. 9' Given the
current status of the banking system, Chinese officials doubt that it would
be able to effectively deal with the speculative pressures that could occur
with a floating exchange rate. 92 Even the U.S.-China ESRC, a group that
has staunchly advocated confronting China over its currency practices, has
recognized that "serious and potentially crippling problems threaten the
financial system
in China and render it vulnerable to excessive volatility
93
and collapse.,
The Chinese government views economic stability as essential for
maintaining long-term political stability.94 It is a widely held view that the
1997-1998 Asian financial crisis was caused largely by the combination
of poorly regulated financial systems and fully convertible currencies. 95
The Chinese government fears a similar situation in which an appreciating
RMB reduces foreign investment, causes deflation, reduces employment,
lowers wages, and ultimately causes worker unrest. 96 Ironically, during the
Asian financial crisis when many other nations substantially devalued their
currencies, China "held the line" and did not devalue the RMB. 97 This
move, which averted further devaluations across Asia was highly praised
by many U.S. officials. 9
In fact, many academics, economists, and financial analysts in the
United States still support the Chinese currency model and see no
immediate need to force China to change it. Douglas J. Holtz-Eakin cited
research that indicated any appreciation in the RMB would not directly
translate to appreciation in the price of goods at all. 99 Some have
commented that even if goods from China appreciated at a rate equal to the
appreciation of the RMB, goods from other countries would simply fill the
gap left behind."' ° Morris Goldstein has said Chinese revaluation alone
will not help the U.S. trade deficit, but rather, a very broad depreciation of

91. Id.
92. Morrison & Labonte, supra note 3, at CRS-3-4.
93. ESRC, supra note 52, at 5. Other areas of concern in the Chinese economy include the
insurance sector, as well as China's fledgling stock market.
94. Morrison & Labonte, supra note 3, at CRS-4.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Eakin is the Director of the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Offices. Blustein, supra
note 14 (citing Eakin, the Director of the Nonpartisan Congressional Budget Offices).
100. Id.
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the dollar is necessary.'
Ronald McKinnon cautions a Chinese
revaluation might cause a "mirror-image financial crisis."''0 2 Jeffery
Frankel10 3 warns, "It is not even true that an appreciation of the renminbi
against the dollar would have an immediately noticeable effect on the
overall U.S. trade deficit or employment."'"
International economic scholars have also weighed in on this topic.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) experts acknowledge that while
China's current situation is not sustainable in the long run, the rise in the
value of the RMB should be gradual.0 5 Nobel economics laureate, Robert
Mundell, has strongly advocated for China to retain its currency peg and
to slowly and methodically pursue a course of currency liberalization. 116
Mundell is also of the view that a revaluation of the RMB
would have little
0 7
effect on the root causes of America's dissatisfaction.1
Some of the most compelling statements in support of Chinese
currency policy come from former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan. From his superior vantage point on the U.S. economy,
Greenspan says he disagrees with the "conventional wisdom" that U.S. job

101. Morris Goldstein, China's Exchange Rate Regime, Peterson Institute for International
Economics (Oct. 1,2003), http://petersoninstitute.org/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=
66.
102. Robyn Meredith, China's Currency Consequences, FORBES.COM, July 7, 2003 (citing
McKinnon, a professor of economics at Stanford University), availableat http://www.forbes.com/
2003/07/07cz rm 0707china.html.
103. Frankel is a professor of capital formation and growth at the Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University. He directs the program in International Finance and
Macroeconomics at the National Bureau of Economic Research and is also on the Business Cycle
Dating Committee. Appointed by former President Bill Clinton in 1996 to his Council of Economic
Advisers, Frankel's responsibilities include international economics, macroeconomics, and
environment. Frankel's past appointments include positions at the Federal Reserve, Institute for
International Economics, International Monetary Fund, University of Michigan, and Yale. His
research includes international finance, monetary and fiscal policy, regional economic blocs, Asia,
commodity prices, and international environmental issues.
104. Frankel, supra note 64, at 2.
105. Raghuram Rajan. Remarks on Global Current Account Imbalances and Financial
Sector-Reform with Examplesfrom China,Address to the Cato Institute, Nov. 3, 2005, available
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2005/110305b.htm. Rajan is the director of the IMF's
research department.
106. Mundell: China Should Keep Currency Peg, June 3, 2005, available at http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/03/content_448457.htm.
107. Id.
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losses would be mitigated by an appreciation of the RMB. °8 In fact, he
believes that Chinese currency appreciation "would be unlikely to have
0 9
much, if any, effect on aggregate employment in the United States.'
Greenspan has also reiterated warnings to policymakers to avoid
succumbing to political pressures from short-sighted, special interest
direction could prove to be
groups as moving in a protectionist
0
"unexpectedly destabilizing."''
Compounding the failings of the Chinese banking system is the sum of
almost one trillion dollars of foreign exchange reserves that the central
bank has accumulated."' The PBOC has had to greatly restrict monetary
growth and regulate capital inflows in order to prevent runaway
inflation. 1 2 Greenspan observed that should this pattern continue, the
Chinese government would be "confronted with the choice of an
overheated economy, with its potential recessionary consequences, or a
curtailing of dollar asset purchases. The later presumably would allow the
renminbi to appreciate against the dollar."' '3 Roubini and Setser have also
found the current situation vis-A-vis the relationship between the United
States and Chinese economies to be unsustainable." 4 They say that the
United States cannot keep borrowing at its current rate, and also, China
cannot continue to accumulate foreign reserves without doing serious
damage to its domestic economy.'1 5 While they urge both countries to take
immediate action, they advocate for a measured response that will
facilitate an orderly and smooth adjustment.1 6 Chinese officials realize
that the day is coming when they will eventually have to liberalize the
RMB and shift to a policy of domestic led growth, but they are not yet
ready to do this." 7

108. Greenspan Sees China's Currency Peg Unrelatedto US Job Losses, Dec. 11, 2003
[hereinafter GreenspanSees], availableathttp://canberra.usembassy.gov/hyper/2003/1211/epf409.
htm.
109. Id. (quoting Alan Greenspan).
110. Id.(quoting Alan Greenspan).
111. Sanford, supranote 15, at CRS-3.
112. Id.
113. Greenspan Sees, supra note 108.
114. Sanford, supra note 15, at CRS-3.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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IIl. AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY OPTIONS
There are several policy options that the United States could pursue to
encourage Chinese currency reform. Each of these options will have a
unique combination of costs and benefits to the U.S. domestic economy.
It follows that the decision to pursue one particular policy course must be
examined with respect to the domestic consequences it carries with it. This
section of the Note discusses the various policy responses that the United
States has available to it, and their likely legal, political and economic
consequences.
A. ContinuedInternationalPressure
As early as 2001, international pressure began mounting on China to
revalue the RMB."18 Since that time, China has repeatedly assured the
international community that it intends to eventually move to a fully
convertible currency." 9 This cumulative international pressure has
achieved some success as evidenced by the decline of the rise of the
decade long peg and the rise of the basket of currencies. Also, from
September 2005 to December 2006, the RMB appreciated 7% against the
dollar. 120 Although many congressional leaders want to see significantly
more appreciation in substantially less time, many commentators speculate
that sustained international pressure is the only true method which will
produce any long term results.' 2 '
The Chinese government has its own independent set of priorities that
dictate its policies on currency valuation. 22 Chinese officials are
considering a transition from an economy based on state ownership and
control to a market-based system. 23 The concern with this process
transition is that it would put a tremendous amount of strain on China's
inefficient and fragmented economy, which cannot generate the
24
employment and domestic resources necessary to sustain the country.
China's only way of compensating for domestic inefficiencies is to pursue
a policy of export led growth. Given this set of priorities, the PBOC chief

118. See Lou, supra note 7, n. 1.
119. Morrison, supranote 16, at 3.
120. Id. at 2.

121. Id. at 1.
122. Sanford, supra note 15, at CRS-3.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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views unilateral U.S. attempts'25 to influence China's currency policy as
'noises' [which] will not change any of the basic conditions and
' 26
sequences of China's exchange rate reform.'
Ultimately, success may depend on the level of sincerity the Chinese
exhibit about converting to a floating currency. If the July 2005 RMB
revaluation was only due to international pressure, then additional pressure
might lead to further results. However, if the Chinese are sincere about
their intent to proceed as fast as possible, then added pressure may also
lead to resentment and resistance among opponents of reform.'27
This policy of exerting international influence on China is tantamount
to maintaining the status-quo and will likely not produce the desired
economic results that some U.S. policymakers seek. The likely results of
such a policy would be that while the nominal exchange rate would vary
only slightly as gradual appreciation occurred, the real rate would more
rapidly adjust as inflation in the two countries diverged.' Despite its
immediate shortcomings, it must be stressed that this policy is a long-term
strategy. It is designed to produce results at a much later time in the future.
The adjustment in the exchange rate would only be realized over time and
29
the pressures on the manufacturing sector would continue to persist.
This reality would not be popular among many U.S. politicians whose
constituencies focus on the short-term and complain about the growing
deficit and losses in manufacturing jobs. Thus the overriding political
pressure for immediate results may ultimately exclude a policy which
might otherwise accomplish the desired long-term goal.
B. Restrict Imports
Alternatively, the United States could choose to restrict Chinese
imports by instituting various forms of unilateral legislation. Many, if not
all, such legislation would include levying a tariff or some other type of
penalty on imports. The tariff would raise the cost of imports to the U.S.
consumer and lead to a decrease in their sales. There are five principal

125. Specifically referring to the Schumer-Graham bill which was introduced in the 109th
Congress. Paul Blustein, 'Watershed' Yuan Revaluation HasMade Few Waves, China'sCurrency
Has Barely Budged, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2005, availableat http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/20/AR2005092001682.html.
126. Id.
127. Sanford, supra note 15, at CRS-6.
128. Morrison & Labonte, supra note 3, at CRS-42.
129. Id.
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means by which the United States could use legislation of this type to
restrict substantially the flow of Chinese imports.
1. Antidumping Actions
Antidumping laws have existed in the United States for almost a
century. If properly implemented, these measures ensure that goods from
other countries are priced fairly in the domestic market. 3 ° Since the date
of its enactment, the Tariff Act of 1930131 has provided the basis for legal
enforcement in the United States and
has incorporated the appropriate
132
international standards as amended.
"Dumping" is the term given to the sale of imported goods at below
fair market value. 133 When such an occurrence causes material injury, or
threatens to cause material industry to a domestic industry producing a
comparable product, an antidumping action may be brought by members
of the affected industry. 34 The Tariff Act allows the United States to
conduct an investigation into the alleged dumping by foreign companies
and impose restitution in the form13 of a duty to offset any disadvantage
suffered by the domestic industry.
The investigatory duties of the alleged dumping activity are shared
between the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) and the U.S.
International Trade Commission (ITC). 136 The DOC investigates the
pricing allegations while the ITC investigates the extent of the injury to the
domestic industry and whether it can be classified as a material injury. 37
In determining whether sales of a product are below fair market value, the
DOC compares the U.S. price of the good to the normal value of the good
138
in the firm's domestic market, or the price of the good in a third market.
However, in determining if a material injury has occurred, the ITC

130. Joseph A. Laroski, Jr., Note, NME.S: A Love Story Nonmarket and Market Economy
Status under U.S. Antidumping Law, 30 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 369, 372 (1999) (observing that

antidumping laws were first passed in 1916).
131. TariffAct of 1930, ch. 497, tit. VII, subtitle B, 731 (1930) (as amended 19 U.S.C. § 1671
(2004)).
132. This also includes GATT recognition of dumping as an unfair trade practice. See Lou,
supra note 7, n.63.
133. TariffAct of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (2007).
134. Id.
135. See id. § 1671.
136. See id. § 1673.
137. Id.
138. See Tariff Act of 1930, § 1677(35)(A). If neither value is available, then the DOC will
construct a value as a normal value. Id. § 1677(18).
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considers many factors, including profits, productivity, import volume,
price depression, return on investment, market share, and production
capacity.'39 If both agencies make affirmative rulings in their respective
investigations, then the DOC issues an order imposing a duty equal to the
average amount by which foreign market value exceeds the U.S. price. 140
American industries have been challenging Chinese goods under
antidumping statutes for almost 30 years.' 4' Because of the undervalued
RMB, the cost of goods in China are routinely lower than they would be
in the United States. Thus, Chinese goods have often been found to satisfy
antidumping criteria, resulting in the imposition of tariffs on those goods.
While the successes of previous antidumping actions might encourage
aggrieved parties to continue pursuing this type of relief, there has never
been an antidumping action aimed at all products from a single nation. The
nature of an antidumping action is inherently limited to one individualized
investigation of one specific product from one specific nation.142 The
process is both time consuming and labor intensive and was never
designed to be a broad, sweeping measure. Given the limited resources of
the DOC and the ITC, an investigation into every Chinese product
imported into the United States would be impossible. Antidumping actions
have been, and will continue to be, an important safeguard for U.S.
industry against unfair trade practices by foreign competitors. However,
it cannot function as the vehicle through which the United States seeks to
influence Chinese currency policy.
2. Subsidies and Countervailing Duties
Another legislative measure the United States may potentially use to
encourage China to reform its currency is the countervailing duties law of
the Tariff Act of 1930.14' This provision of the Tariff Act deals primarily
with foreign government subsidies to foreign manufacturers and

139. See id. § 1677(7)(C).
140. See id.§ 1673.
141. Products investigated include crawfish tail meat, color television sets, ball bearings, iron
tables, persulfates, wooden furniture, and automotive replacement windshields. Lou, supra note 7,
at 466.
142. The DOC has always considered China to be a Non-Market Economy (NME). When
considering the factors for valuation of goods from a NME, the DOC must compare the domestic
value of the goods to a "market economy country... considered to be appropriate." Tariff Act of
1930, 19 U.S.C. § 773(c)(1)(B). See also id. § 773(c)(4) (listing other valuing factors of production
to be applied in the DOC's calculations).
143. See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1671-77 (2007).
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exporters, 144 and as amended, the statute further incorporates the GATT
provisions on subsidies and countervailing duties.14 The statute authorizes
countervailing duties to be levied against a product only after the United
States has determined that the product, or industry, has been subsidized by
a foreign government, or an agency of the foreign government. 146 Further,
duties cannot be levied unless it can be shown that the subsidization has
caused or threatens to cause material injury to a domestic U.S. industry.'47
The investigatory process for a countervailing duty is almost identical
to an antidumping investigation. Both the DOC and the ITC share the
responsibilities of the investigation and both agencies must render positive
findings in their respective investigations in order for the duty to be
levied. 4 Unlike an antidumping action, the DOC is responsible for
determining whether there has been a material injury, while the ITC is
responsible for deciding whether a product has received a countervailable
subsidy under the meaning of the statute. 141
The determination of whether a subsidy is countervailable is complex
and fraught with detailed analysis. 50 The Tariff Act includes an exhaustive
definition of what constitutes a countervailable subsidy.' Among its
many criteria is the requirement that the alleged foreign subsidy be

144. Id.
145. See id. § 1671(b). The specific GATI7 provision is Article XVI. See GATT 1994, art.
XVI, availableat http://www.marxists.org/history/capitalism/gatt/ch 16.htm.
146. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (2007).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See generally id. § 1671(c).
150. 19 U.S.C. § 1677, in part, defines a countervailable subsidy as,
A subsidy... [for] which an authority(i) provides a financial contribution,
(ii) provides any form of income or price support within the meaning of Article
XVI of the GATT 1994, or
(iii) makes a payment to a funding mechanism to provide a financial contribution,
or entrusts or directs a private entity to make a financial contribution, if providing
the contribution would normally be vested in the government and the practice does
not differ in substance from practices normally followed by governments, to a
person and a benefit is thereby conferred. For purposes of this paragraph and
paragraphs (5A) and (5B), the term "authority" means a government of a country
or any public entity within the territory of the country.
19 U.S.C. § 1677.
151. See id
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demonstrate intent to benefit a targeted industry,
specific enough to clearly
52
exporter.
or
producer,
The statute's specificity requirement defines a benefitting subsidy as
"a financial contribution," or a transfer of money that takes "any form of
income or price support within the meaning of Article XVI of the GATT
1994."' 3 Or, the subsidy is classified as specific, if it takes the form of"a
payment to a funding mechanism to provide a financial contribution... to
a person and a benefit is thereby conferred."' 54 Additionally, the statute
explains a subsidy is not specific if "eligibility is automatic. . the criteria
or conditions for eligibility are strictly followed ...[and] the criteria or
conditions are clearly set forth in the relevant statute, regulation, or other
official document so as to be capable of verification.""' When taken
together, the Tariff Act of 1930 operates for the limited purpose of
combating subsidies that are beneficial to "an individual firm, industry, or
group of enterprises," and not "a government program that benefits all
'
industries." 156
The Chinese currency policy is a national policy that is applicable to
every firm, industry, and enterprise in China. To the extent that it confers
upon Chinese products a competitive advantage in the global marketplace,
it does so equally, uniformly, and without preference for any one industry
vis-A-vis any other. It is difficult to imagine a successful claim under the
countervailing duty statutes because of the stringent specificity
requirements that a subsidy must fulfill before triggering the statute's
enforcement. Unless the statutes are amended to define a subsidy in much

152. See id.
153. The material portions of Article XVI § B(4) of the GATT 1994 are as follows:
Further, as from 1 January 1958 or the earliest practicable date thereafter,
contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of
subsidy on the export of any product other than a primary product which subsidy
results in the sale of such product for export at a price lower than the comparable
price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market. Until 31
December 1957 no contracting party shall extend the scope of any such
subsidization beyond that existing on 1 January 1955 by the introduction of new,
or the extension of existing, subsidies.
GAIT 1994, art. XVI § B(4).
154. 19 U.S.C. § 1677.
155. Id.§ 1677(5A)(D)(ii).
156. STEPHEN D. COHEN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS
ECONOMICS, POLITICs, LAW, AND ISSUES 172 (2d ed. 2003).
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broader terms, U.S. industries will continue to fail in attacking Chinese
currency policy under this legislation.
3. Congressional Legislation
In recent years, Congress has shown a growing willingness to address
the issue of Chinese currency manipulation. A total of nine bills
concerning Chinese currency practices were introduced into the 108th
Congress in September and October 2003.57 Seventeen bills on the same
issue were introduced in the 109th Congress.' 58 As of the date of this Note,
several new bills have been introduced just four months into the 110th
Congress concerning China's currency manipulation.' 59 All these bills are
targeted at China to encourage it to liberalize the RMB and call on the
Bush Administration to take more forceful action to facilitate reform of
Chinese currency policies."0
A few of these bills have proposed a 27.5% tariff on all imported
Chinese goods. 6 ' These bills were drafted under the assumption that the
RMB is artificially undervalued by an average of 27.5%, which acts as a
157. Lou, supra note 7, n.45 and accompanying text.
158. Morrison, supra note 8, at CRS-14-16.
159. All pending bills may be viewed at the following Library of Congress Web Site:
http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).
160. See id.
161. Several bills include a tariffportion as a potential remedy to the current situation. Among
them are:
1. Unfair Chinese Automotive Tariff Equalization Act (Introduced in House),
H.R.388.IH, 110th Cong. (2007).
2. Resolved (Introduced in Senate), S. RES.123.IS, 110th Cong. (2007).
3. Stopping Overseas Subsidies Act (Introduced in Senate), S.974.IS, 110th Cong.
(2007).
4. Nonmarket Economy Trade Remedy Act of 2007 (Introduced in House),
H.R.1229.IH, 110th Cong. (2007)
5. Trade Law Reform Act of 2007 (Introduced in House), H.R.708.IH, 110th
Cong. (2007).
6. Fair Currency Act of 2007 (Introduced in Senate),S.796.IS, 110th Cong. (2007).
7. Fair urrency Act of 2007 (Introduced in House), H.R.782.IH, 110th Cong.
(2007).
8. Currency Harmonization Initiative Through Neutralizing Action Act of 2005
(Introduced in House), H.R.321.IH, 110th Cong. (2007).
9. Strengthening America's Trade Laws Act (Introduced in Senate), S.364.IS
110th Cong. (2007).
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subsidy to Chinese exporters and a tax on U.S. importers.'62 Furthermore,
the bills' drafters believe that China's intervention in the currency markets
violates the spirit and letter of the World Trade Organization.'63
Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994
(GATT) is commonly cited as the legal basis for the proposed tariffs. 64 In
general, Article XXI allows a country to take necessary precautions, with
65
respect to international trade, when issues of national security arise.'
Specifically, Article XXI protects security interests with respect to
"fissionable materials," arms trafficking, or those "taken in time of war or
other emergency in international relations.' ' 166 The congressional sponsors
of these bills strongly advocate the position that protection of the U.S.
manufacturing sector is essential to U.S. security interests and is a matter
of national security. 167 However, it is unlikely that this congressional
definition of security interests was contemplated by the drafters of the
GATT.

162. See id.
163. Seeid.
164. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994)) (adopting GATT 1994,33 I.L.M. 1143, art. XXI (1994)).
Article XXI is commonly refered to as the security provision. It states, in pertinent part:
1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure
of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are
derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to
such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly
for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
GATT 1994, art. XXI.
165. See GATT 1994, art. XXI(B).
166. See GATT 1994, art. XXI(B).
167. See list of pending congressional bills, supranote 161.
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Additionally, an argument can be made that these legislative measures,
if passed, are undertaken in a time of war 68 and are therefore consistent
with Article XXI. Conversely, it could be said that the aim of the proposed
congressional legislation is, at best, only tenuously connected with the
global war on terror and is therefore probably inconsistent with the spirit
of Article XXI. Despite this apparent inconsistency, at least one
in a
congressional bill 169 garnered the support of sixty-seven senators
70
procedural vote, indicating popular support for the measure.
It is unlikely that the WTO would support such a broad reading of
Article XXI, and any piece of legislation based upon it. Additionally, if the
United States were to impose such a protectionist measure upon China, it
would run the risk of political fall-out with the international community.
This reaction would likely take the form of retaliatory tariffs on U.S.
goods, based upon means similar to those in Article XXI.
4. Section 201 Action
Another piece of legislation which has been passed to combat foreign
nations' unfair trade practices is section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.'
Section 201 grants the U.S. President the authority to take emergency
action to protect a domestic industry that has suffered substantial injury
due to a sudden surge in foreign imports. 72 The authority to take such
action is predicated on Article XIX of the GATT, which allows a nation
to restrict imports of a product if its domestic industry is seriously injured
or is threatened with serious injury.'7 3
All section 201 actions begin with an ITC investigation of the extent
to which an industry is injured by the import of a foreign product. 74 If the
ITC determines that an imported product is "a substantial cause of serious
injury," then the statute authorizes the President of the United States to
take "all appropriate and feasible action within his power . . . [to]
168. The United States has been fighting the war on terror since the attacks of September 11,
2001.
169. This was the Schumer-Graham bill introduced in the 109th Congress. See S.295, 109th
Cong. (2005).
170. Morrison, supra note 16.
171. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (Section 201) (codified as
amended as 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (2007)).
172. Kelly Henry, Comment, Is the United States the World's Dumping Groundfor Steel?
Recent Influxes in Steel Imports in the United States, the Effects, and the Possible Remedies, 25
Hous. J. INT'L L. 381, 401-02 (2003).
173. See GATT 1994, art. XIX.
174. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (2007).
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facilitate... a positive adjustment to import competition."' 75 Such action
may take the form of a duty, a tariff-rate quota, a quantitative restriction
on the importation of the product, negotiations with the foreign country to
adjust the export volume of the target product, initiating an international
dialog to address the underlying causes of the import surge, or any other
measures the President deems necessary.' 76
Historically, section 201 has been politically unpopular due to its
protectionist nature and has often been reserved as a measure of last
resort.' Section 201's heightened requirement of substantialinjury has
also been used as a barrier to encourage industry to seek less drastic forms
of relief under the antidumping laws or the countervailing duty laws, both
of which only require a showing of a material injury.'78 However, section
201 has been used as recently as 2002 by the Bush Administration,

175. See id.
176. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(3) (2007). The relevant portion of the statute is as follows:
(3) The President may, for purposes of taking action under paragraph (1)-(A) proclaim an increase in, or the imposition of, any duty on the imported article;
(B) proclaim a tariff-rate quota on the article;
(C) proclaim a modification or imposition of any quantitative restriction on the
importation of the article into the United States;
(D) implement one or more appropriate adjustment measures, including the
provision of trade adjustment assistance under chapter 2 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2271 et
seq.,
(E) negotiate, conclude, and carry out agreements with foreign countries limiting
the export from foreign countries and the import into the United States of such
article;
(F) proclaim procedures necessary to allocate among importers by the auction of
import licenses quantities of the article that are permitted to be imported into the
United States;
(G) initiate international negotiations to address the underlying cause of the
increase in imports of the article or otherwise to alleviate the injury or threat
thereof,
(H) submit to Congress legislative proposals to facilitate the efforts of the
domestic industry to make a positive adjustment to import competition;
(I) take any other action which may be taken by the President under the authority
of law and which the President considers appropriate and feasible for purposes of
paragraph (1); and
(J) take any combination of actions listed in subparagraphs (A) through (I).
Id.
177. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 156, at 154-55.
178. See id
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signaling that perhaps the fear of losing American jobs is overtaking
traditional American zeal for free trade.'79
While section 201 is a powerful tool used to influence international
trade, it seems to be simultaneously over inclusive and under-inclusive.
The statute is over-inclusive because its punitive scope does not
discriminate between products based on their country of origin. Thus, the
consequences are felt by all countries which export a particular product to
the United States not just the country at fault.' 0A 201 action could have
unintended, negative political consequences for the international
community. Given the increasing size of the global marketplace, it is
becoming increasingly unlikely that a particular product is imported to the
United States from only a single country. Correspondingly, it becomes
more likely that a 201 action will affect at least one foreign nation's
exporters who are merely innocent third parties and have not contributed
to the domestic injury.
The statute is also under-inclusive in that it only protects against swells
of imports of a specific product in an industry, but makes no mention of
singling out all products from a certain nation. As mentioned above, the
ITC is charged with investigating every industry which claims that a
serious injury has been suffered by a surge in foreign imports. In order for
a 201 action to be sustained against all Chinese products, the ITC must
examine every industry in which Chinese goods are imported and
determine that the domestic industry has suffered serious injury as a result
of those goods. While current trade data is widely available to exhibit the
effect of Chinese imports on certain U.S. industries,'' the ITC's limited
resources severely restrict it from conducting the exhaustive investigation
necessary to reach a legitimate determination of serious injury.
Apparently, suffering from the same deficiencies as the antidumping and
countervailing duties laws, section 201 seems to be an inappropriate way
to influence China to reform its currency policy.

179. In March 2002, President Bush invoked section 201 to impose steel tariffs against foreign
imports. Although the tariff was eventually appealed through the WTO and repealed, the move
signaled President Bush's willingness to take such drastic actions. Trade Policy Review,
United States,
29-34, WT/TPR?G/126 (Dec. 17, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/
englishltratope/tpre/S 126-0_e.doc.
180. For example, if a U.S. industry were substantially harmed by the influx of a product from
China, a section 201 action could impose a duty on that product regardless of its country of origin.
Therefore, a Japanese manufacturer/exporter of the same product would share equally in the
consequences with the Chinese manufacturers despite not being the cause of the injury.
181. Industry andJob Trends of the US. and China, http://www.uscc.gov/trade-data-and_
analyses/industryjob-trends.php (listing graphs detailing US/China trade trends).
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5. Section 301 Investigation
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 gives the United States another
tool to combat China's undesirable foreign trade practices. "Section 301
82 under which the United States
...is the principal statutory authority'
may impose trade sanctions against foreign countries that maintain acts,
policies and practices that violate, or deny U.S. rights or benefits under,
trade agreements, or are unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory and
burden or restrict U.S. commerce.' ' 3 A section 301 investigation may be
commenced by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) on its own initiative
or on petition by any interested party. 8 4 Upon commencing an
investigation, section 301 directs the USTR to seek consultation with the
foreign government under investigation.' 85 If the investigation involves an
alleged violation of a trade agreement, such as a WTO agreement or the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the USTR must use the
dispute resolution procedure stipulated by that agreement.' 86
If the USTR finds that U.S. rights under a trade agreement are being
infringed upon, or that a foreign government's actions or policies
unjustifiably burden U.S. commerce, section 301 mandates retaliatory
action' 87 unless an exception applies.' However, if a foreign nation's
182. Codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
183. Jean Heilman Grier, Office of Chief Counsel for International Commerce, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act (2005), available at
www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/301 .html.
184. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a), (b).
185. 19 U.S.C. § 2413.
186. Id.
187. 19U.S.C. §2411(a).
188. Exceptions include:
(A) [when] [t]he [WTO] has adopted a report, or a ruling issued under the formal
dispute settlement proceeding provided under any other trade agreement finds,
that(i) the rights of the United States under a trade agreement are not being denied, or
(ii) the act, policy, or practice(I) is not a violation of, or inconsistent with, the rights of the United States, or
(II) does not deny, nullify, or impair benefits to the United States under any trade
agreement; or
(B) the Trade Representative finds that(i) the foreign country is taking satisfactory measures to grant the rights of the
United States under a trade agreement,
(ii) the foreign country has(I) agreed to eliminate or phase out the act, policy, or practice, or
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practices or policies are found to be merely unreasonable or
discriminatory, then the USTR may impose discretionary sanctions. 8 9
Much of the efficacy of a 301 action therefore lies in the USTR's initial
characterization of the action or policy at issue. Practices or policies
characterized as "unjustifiably burdensome" carry heavier consequences
than those deemed to be "unreasonable and discriminatory" practices or
policies. The label of unreasonable may be applied to an "act, policy, or
practice,... [that] while not necessarily in violation of, or inconsistent
with, the international legal rights of the United States, is otherwise unfair
and inequitable."' 90 These acts, policies, and practices include but are not
limited to, those that deny fair and equitable opportunities for the
establishment of an enterprise, constitute export targeting, or constitute a
persistent pattern of conduct in violation of workers' human rights.' 9'
In making a determination as to the reasonableness of China's currency
policy, the USTR may scrutinize the policy on two fronts. First, China's
stringent currency control system may be viewed as a substantial barrier
to foreign companies doing business in China. However, the Chinese
government has always applied the currency controls to all firms doing
business in China. The currency control policies regulate all firms, both
foreign and domestic, and thus, might not be viewed as treating one
unfairly in comparison to the treatment of others.
Second, the undervaluation of the RMB could be considered to be an
effective tax on U.S. imports, making U.S. goods more expensive in the
Chinese market. If this analysis is applied, it would be possible for the
USTR to find that U.S. goods are at a substantial disadvantage in China

(II) agreed to an imminent solution to the burden or restriction on United States
commerce that is satisfactory to the Trade Representative,
(iii) it is impossible for the foreign country to achieve the results described in
clause (i) or (ii), as appropriate, but the foreign country agrees to provide to the
United States compensatory trade benefits that are satisfactory to the Trade Representative,
(iv) in extraordinary cases, where the taking of action under this subsection would
have an adverse impact on the United States economy substantially out of
proportion to the benefits of such action, taking into account the impact of not
taking such action on the credibility of the provisions of this [chapter 19 U.S.C.S.
§§ 2411 et seq.], or
(v) the taking of action under this subsection would cause serious harm to the
national security of the United States.
Id. 241 l(a)(2).
189. Id. § 2411(b).
190. Id. § 2411(d)(3)(A).
191. See id. § 2411(d)(3)(B).
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and therefore find that the underlying currency policies are unreasonable.
The level of unreasonableness, however, must be directly proportional to
the degree to which the USTR finds the RM[B undervalued. If the USTR
finds that the RMB is only slightly undervalued, the corresponding
disadvantage of U.S. goods might not rise to a level sufficient to brand
Chinese policy as unreasonable.
However, even if the USTR does find China's currency practices to be
unreasonable, it would still have the discretion to take action or to do
nothing at all.' 92 This discretion will most likely reflect the goals and
policies of the U.S. President because the USTR derives its powers
directly from the Chief Executive's office.' 93 Some analysts have
speculated that the current USTR might curtail its discretion to impose
sanctions on China because
of other, indispensable political aspirations of
94
the Bush administration. 1
As with all political issues, China's currency and its effect on the U.S.
economy has fluctuated in priority over time. In past years, the Bush
administration has needed China's support to accomplish various foreign
policy objectives such as anti-terrorism and anti-nuclear proliferation
initiatives. In order to secure its cooperation, the Bush Administration has
largely avoided direct confrontation with China over this controversial
issue. However, recent changes in the U.S. political landscape might signal
a new willingness on the part of the Bush Administration to raise the
issue.' 95 The increasingly aggressive rhetoric of the Bush Administration
suggests that it will soon exert greater political pressure on China and take
a more hard line approach to Chinese trade issues.
While a section 301 investigation has been politically undesirable in
the past, many signs point to a change of U.S. sentiment and greater
openness to the possibility. Shifting political power, changing trade
policies, growing concern over the U.S. trade deficit, and the powerful
lobby of the manufacturing sector have all played a part in focusing the
nation's attention on China and solidifying its resolve to find a solution.
It is possible that the protectionist elements in the United States will
become so politically powerful that policymakers will pursue this course
192. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b).
193. Id.
194. Recently the Bush Administration has sought China's cooperation with several foreign
policy initiatives including some delicate negotiations with North Korea over its nuclear
proliferation agenda.
195. In the 2006 mid-term election the Democratic Party became the majority in both the
House and the Senate. While previously enjoying the support of the Republican majority, President
Bush now faces staunch political opposition from the new majority in Congress.
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of action to appease the outcry. Because of its discretionary nature, a
section 301 investigation may be a convenient way to single out
unjustifiable and unreasonable Chinese policies and levy sanctions against
them. However, the sanctions would have to be consistent with the
political agenda of the sitting U.S. President for such action ever to be
taken.
C. MultilateralInternationalAction
Because the United States and China are both members of the WTO,
the United States may choose to avail itself of the WTO dispute settlement
process to resolve its trade conflicts with China. 196 If the United States
were to initiate a complaint against China with the WTO, it would most
likely base the complaint on Article XV of the GATT, which deals with
exchange agreements between two or more countries.
Article XV of the GATT states, "Contracting parties shall not, by
exchange action, frustrate the intent of the provisions of this Agreement,
nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions of the Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund [ILMF]."' 97 Additionally,
Article XV requires that WTO members "accept all findings of statistical
and other facts presented by the [IMF] relating to foreign exchange,
monetary reserves and balances of payments.' '59 8 This means that should
the United States file a WTO complaint against China, it must accept the
IMF's determination as to whether taking action is appropriate. 99
The IMF was created to promote international monetary cooperation
by providing a forum for consultation and collaboration on international
monetary problems, promoting exchange stability, maintaining orderly
exchange arrangements among members, and avoiding competitive
exchange depreciation.2 0 The IMF regularly consults with its member
196. The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) outlines the procedures for the
dispute settlement process. The entire process is administered by the dispute settlement body
(DSB). The DSU mandates that clashing Member States enter into consultations in good faith and
proceed along a strict timeline. Should the consultations fail to produce an agreement, the DSB then
creates a panel that will serve as an international tribunal. This panel is responsible for holding
hearings and issuing a report on the dispute. Should a member disagree with a report, it may file
an appeal with the appellate body (AB) which would then conduct its own hearings and issue its
own report. Finally, the DSB then enforces compliance by the member. See J.G. MERRILLS,
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 205-10, (3d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1984).
197. GATr art. XV.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. IMF Articles, supra note 10, art. I.
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states to conduct surveillance and "provides advice on issues ranging from
the choice of exchange rate regime to ensuring consistency between [the]
regime and... fiscal and monetary policies." ''
In 2006, after its consultations with China, the TMF found that "from
a global perspective, exchange rate flexibility would not only serve
China's best interest, but would also help contribute to an orderly process
for resolving global current account imbalances., 20 2 The IMF directors
also noted that "greater exchange rate flexibility is needed to enable the
[PBOC] to use its monetary policy instruments more effectively."2 3 These
statements are the latest installments of a rhetorical trend in which the IMF
has urged China to reform its currency policies but refrained from setting
a deadline to do so. To date, the IMF has largely allowed the Chinese
government to determine the proper timing and scope of currency
revaluation as long as the ostensible goal remains a fully floating exchange
rate.
Should the United States allege that China has manipulated its
exchange rate to gain an unfair advantage, the IMF would be called upon
to conduct an investigation into the alleged currency manipulation. Article
IV of the IMF Articles of Agreement states that members shall "avoid
manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order
to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair
competitive advantage over other members," 2" and under IMF
surveillance procedures, a principal indicator of such manipulation is
"protracted large-scale intervention in one direction in the exchange
market. 20 5 The protracted purchases of billions of U.S. dollars by China

201. IMF Surveillance, A Factsheet, http://www.imf.md/imfsurveil.htnl (last visited Dec. 31,
2007).
202. Staff Report, People's Republic of China: 2006 Article IV Consultation-StaffReport,
IMF Country Report No. 06/394 (Oct. 2006), availableathttp://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/
2006/crO6394.pdf.
203. IMF Executive Board Concludes 2006 Article IV Consultation with the People's
Republic of China (Sept. 11, 2006), IMF Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 06/103,
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/pn/2006/pn06103.htm.
204. IMF Articles, supra note 10, art. IV § l(iii).
205. IMF, Surveillance Over Exchange Rate Policies, Decision No. 5392 (77/63) (1977),
compiledin selectedDecisionsand SelectedDocuments ofthe InternationalMonetaryFund,Thirty
FirstIssue, 25,27 (Dec. 31, 2006), availableat http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/sd/2006/3 Is
tissue.pdf.
2. In its surveillance of the observance by members of the principles set forth
above, the Fund shall consider the following developments as among those which
might indicate the need for discussion with a member:
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would seem to fit this IMF definition of currency manipulation.
Upon a determination that such an intervention has occurred, the IMF
would ask China to explain the motivation behind its actions. China would
then be given the opportunity to explain its motives behind its currency
market interventions and this explanation would be given the benefit of
any reasonable doubt. Upon consideration of all available and relevant
information regarding China's exchange rate policy, the IMF would then
make an independent assessment as to whether China's representation was
correct. On that basis, the IMF would make its determination as to whether
being taken for one of the prohibited purposes
the actions in question were
20 6
identified in Article IV.
China's likely defense of its interventions in the currency markets
would be that it has maintained the same exchange rate for over a decade
and, like many other countries, has bought U.S. treasury securities for even
longer. China would point to the consistency and longevity of its currency
practices to convince the IMF that no currency manipulation has occurred.
While it is not clear how convincing this "business as usual" defense
would be in the eyes of the IMF, it is equally unclear if the IMF would
side with the United States on this issue. As previously noted, the TMF has
been wary of giving China any ultimatums with respect to its currency
revaluation. The IMF has not even attempted to promulgate a timeline for
RMB revaluation, choosing instead to allow China the freedom to move
(i) protracted large-scale intervention in one direction in the exchange market;
(ii) an unsustainable level of official or quasi-official borrowing, or excessive and
prolonged short-term official or quasi-official lending, for balance of payments
purposes;
(iii) (a) the introduction, substantial intensification, or prolonged maintenance, for
balance of payments purposes, of restrictions on, or incentives for, current
transactions or payments, or
(b) the introduction or substantial modification for balance of payments purposes
of restrictions on, or incentives for, the inflow or outflow of capital;
(iv) the pursuit, for balance of payments purposes, of monetary and other domestic
financial policies that provide abnormal encouragement or discouragement to
capital flows;
(v) behavior of the exchange rate that appears to be unrelated to underlying
economic and financial conditions including factors affecting competitiveness and
long-term capital movements; and
(vi) unsustainable flows of private capital.
Id. at 26-27.
206. IMF, Article IV of the Fund's Articles of Agreement: An Overview of the Legal
Framework, June 28, 2006, at 16, available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/pp/eng/2006/
062806.pdf.
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at its own pace. If the United States pursued a case against China by
alleging currency manipulation, and the IMF did not produce an
affirmative finding, the United States would be compelled to accept this
finding as the ultimate resolution on the issue and no further international
action could be taken. Given this state of affairs, it would not be in U.S.
best interests to rely on the IMF for an affirmative finding of currency
manipulation, even though the United States seems to have a prima facia
case for currency manipulation.
On February 2, 2007, the United States lodged a formal complaint
against China with the WTO. 0 7 The complaint specifically alleged that
China uses its tax policies to illegally subsidize Chinese exporting firms,
giving them a global, competitive advantage.2 8 While not specifically
addressing Chinese currency policy as a form of subsidy, the outcome of
the current WTO challenge could serve as a barometer for the likelihood
of a successful challenge on that issue.
Critics of Chinese currency policy have been calling on the Bush
Administration to initiate a WTO complaint against China for some
time.20 9 Prior to this time, however, the Bush Administration has
maintained that a successful WTO challenge was doubtful and would be
"more damaging than helpful" for the above stated reasons.210 This latest
move is perhaps an attempt to focus the WTO on a relevant "gateway
issue," which if successful, could open the door to a direct challenge to
China's currency policy as an export subsidy and also as a form of
currency manipulation.

207. Associated Press, U.S. Starts Legal Action Against China at WTO Over Subsidies, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Feb. 2, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=4449502.
208. Request for Consultations by the United States, China-CertainMeasures Granting
Refunds, Reductionsor Exemptions FromTaxes and OtherPayments, WT/DS358/1 (Feb. 7,2007),
available at http://www.worldtradelaw. net/clds358-1 (cr).pdf.
209. In 2004 the Bush Administration rejected two requests: one filed by the China Currency
Coalition (a group of U.S. industrial, service, agricultural, and labor organizations) and one filed
by 30 members of Congress. Both petitions sought to have the United States bring a case before the
WTO challenging China's currency policy. Morrison & Labonte, supranote 3, at CRS-38.
210. NeenaMoorjmi, Statement from USTR Spokesperson Regarding a Section 301 Petition
on China's Currency Regime (Nov. 12,2007), availableat http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/
Spokesperson Statements/Statement_fromUSTR SpokespersonNeenaMoorjaniRegarding
a-Section 301 Petitionon ChinasCurrencyRegime.html?ht-.
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IV. CONCLUSION

When asked whether the United States would ultimately regret pushing
China to revalue the RMB, Nouriel Roubini, a professor of economics and
international business at New York University, commented, "the first rule
of good manners-and finance as well-is that you should not bite the
hand that feeds you."2"' With the recent flurry of proposed legislation,
fueled by the protectionist outcries of the manufacturing sector, one cannot
help but wonder whether this entire issue is nothing more than a creature
of popular politics. Almost daily the mainstream media features stories of
American workers who have lostjobs and blame the upheaval in their lives
on "low cost Chinese goods." While the loss of American jobs is always
unfortunate and regrettable, a closer look at the facts shows a much more
complex story than many people are otherwise led to believe.
American manufacturing is dying. There is a long-term trend, even
more pronounced than the Chinese currency issue, which shows U.S.
production is shifting away from manufacturing2 2 and toward the service
sector.213 Americans, as a whole, are becoming better suited for producing
knowledge and technology intensive goods while nations like China are
becoming increasingly efficient at producing labor intensive goods.
Because of growing international trade, over time this trend of production
specialization will continue regardless of China's currency policy.21 4 New
reactionary policies should not be applied willy nilly, based on the desires
of a relatively small, and shrinking, segment of the U.S. economy. Rather,
policymakers ought to look to the future to decide which direction the
United States should pursue, and what steps are necessary to realize those
goals.

211. Blustein, supra note 14.
212. U.S. employment in manufacturing has fallen from 31.8% in 1960 to 22.4% in 1980 to
11% by the end of 2006. Morrison & Labonte, supra note 2, at CRS-3 n.2.
213. See Craig Elwell, Deindustrialization of the US. Economy: The Roles of Trade,
Productivity,and Recession, CRS Report RL3250, Apr. 15, 2004, availableat http://opencrs.cdt.
org/rpts/RL32350_20040415.pdf. See also Robert Rowthorn & Ramana Rasmaswamy,
Deindustrialization:Its Causes and Implications, 10 ECON. ISSUES (1997), http://www.imf.org/
EXTERNALPUBS/FT/ISSUES 10/INDEX.HTM.
214. "The decline in manufacturing employment is not unique to the United States. According
to a study done by Alliance Capital Management, manufacturing employment among the world's
20 largest economies declined by 22 million jobs between 1995 and 2002." Wayne M. Morrison
& Marc Labonte, China's Currency: Economic Issues and Optionsfor US. Trade Policy, CRS
Report for Congress RL32165 (Oct. 2, 2006), at CRS-27, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/74900.pdf.
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Still, much of the U.S. public refuses to embrace the changing nature
of our global economy and American workers' new roles in it. Instead
many "pro-American" interest groups lose themselves in the nostalgia of
days gone by when American factories thrived, American cars were king,
and a bottle of Coca-Cola cost a nickel. In an effort to return to the goodole-days, they lobby Congress to enact rash legislation, garner media
attention to sell their sympathetic plight, and interject a high level of
emotion into what ought to be a rational, economic discussion.
Hypocritically, these are often the same people who demand low cost
goods at Wal Mart, and enjoy the benefits of home ownership via a
mortgage at historically low interest rates. However, the U.S. public
cannot have its cake and eat it too. Favorable U.S. interest rates and access
to low cost import goods would be seriously undermined by a major
alteration to China's currency policy.
The solution to the loss of American jobs is not to berate China over its
currency valuation strategies, but to focus on creating new jobs that are
sustainable and competitive in the new global economy, and to re-educate
the American population to embrace a more savings oriented lifestyle. To
do this, American workers will need to learn new skills, enter new
industries, and blaze new economic trails. All Americans will need to
reexamine their own personal financial habits and evolve to meet the
demands of changing domestic and foreign economies. The necessary
adjustment may seem daunting at first, but in reality, it is a challenge that
Americans have always overcome. Perseverance, creativity, and common
sense are skills that every American, blue collar or otherwise, has always
possessed.
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